



Classification and Signing LibreOffice

ON A PERSONAL BASES

FBIT

Retired LtCol FT (Fekke) Bakker MSc BSc CIPP/e CISSP CISA Sr Innovation Manager

16-10-2017





Agenda

- 1. The problem
- 2. About collaboration
 - TSCP (focus F35)
 - The military operation
 - Complexity of collaboration
 - Organizing trust
 - NATO working groups (FMN + Stanag 4774)
- 3. ABAC architecture
 - Attributes on people and data
 - Hardening of those attributes (organizing trust)
- 4. Built in LibreOffice
 - First implementation SHA256
 - Second implementing TSCP controls for IP and EC on document level
 - Third investigation of regulatory compliance (IP, EC, Privacy, Sensitivity and Archiving)
 - Fourth implementation regulatory controls on paragraph level
- 5. Additional implementations
 - Export to and signing of PDF (other presentation)
 - Implementation of PAdES and XAdES (for archiving)





The Problem

Sharing Information with

- So many nationalities
- So many interest groups
- So many groups with different trust levels
- From one single infrastructure

Sharing information on basis of

- Need to know (multiple levels of sensitivity aka security)
- Duty to share
- Pushing
- Pulling

The Solution

- Add attributes on people
- Add attributes on information (this is data classification)
- Harden the attributes on the information (this can be done with signing)
- Release info on bases of those (hardened) attributes
- Release info on initiative sender OR receiver
- Additional benefits:

good practice for preventing data leakage good opportunity for complying to GDPR













Free Social Business IT

Fekke Bakker

Expertise in Governance, Privacy, Security en Auditing

35 years experience in IT and Security

- Leadership,
- Management,
- Innovation,
- Security,
- Advice



Ministry of Defence





- Intellectual Property
- **Export laws**
- Privacy up to Anonimity
- Organized and Demonstrable Trust
- Scalable, granular, in maintainable











Consulting Partner at 45YNERGY





About Collaboration

Example Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II

- · Many nations
- · Many companies

How? See www.tscp.org

Importance Secure Credentials Example







DETREUTION STATEMENT A Approved for public resease, destruction is unlimited

Italy

Italian Industrial Partners

Locations








About collaboration


Example The Military Operation

- Many souvereign nations
- Many army's
- Many Many NGO's











Citation 2017-10-06:


https://www.flickr.com/photos/minusma/12192410766





Complexity of collaboration


Nato's Federated Mission Networking NATO Secret Only








Complexity of collaboration










The need to collaborate with whom



Sylghill July

NL-MO

Ad Hoc

Other Department


Supply Chain Acquisition

The state of the s





Complexity of collaboration







Complexity of Collaboration

Organizing Trust

- Infrastructure (incl assurance for multiple levels)
- Procedures (incl assurance for multiple levels)

The Model:

Multiple Levels of Assurance (LoA)

- More sensitive information need higher LoA → more expensive
- Scalability demands as low cost as possible
- Every organization only need 1 LoA
- Interaction between different LoA is not only possible, but also a necessity
- Attribute Based Access Control makes this possible On data: this is data classification Assurance: this is signing





Conceptual enlarged trust model Multiple Levels of Assurance

Complexity of Collaboration																												
_	Project/proces trust	es	Klachten 	unclass procurement	Unclass maintenance	Unclass research	:	DV collaboration	:																			
	Company trust	Burge	r	drijfs	sleven Inter				rdep																			
₹	Technical trust					<mark>ing, eID, Haagse</mark>									L	OV	V	as	SI	Jra	an	C	9					
ں ⊂			it is a																									
= ပြ		The n	ormal	ronn	nent																							
Multiple Levels of Assurance																												
	Project/proces trust	LIST	PO JSF FMS	Other		PO JSF	F16	User F35	Subcontractor F35	Maintenance F35	Other		Chinook	Apache Other	:	FACE	Reports					:		Collaboration Portal	Consultation Portal	Political Portal	Others	:
	Company trust	US-D		U			ockheed Martin					Boeing			·	NIR	Others			ers	EU UN			ΝΔΤΟ				
	Technical trust		su - TS		•			200	6	Mediur				n assurai				an	nce									
n on		Here, it is about Higher level of as								nce																Allen-		
<u>r</u> 60		The d	lesigne	P																								
ž Ľ		Alrea	dy (20	14-0	4-01) in p	lace	are:	Tec	hnic	al tr	ust;	Us-D	oD t	rust,	NLR	trus	t and	proj	ect t	trusts	with	n LIS	Γ, ΡΟ	JSF :	and F	ACE.	
Jultiple																												
	Project/proces trust	PCN :	other 	Recconance	Intel	Ops	others	:	Redeploy	Other																		
) ≥	Company trust		Static MALI A									Oth	ers		ш	:	h	_				•						
	Technical trust		su - Fe							_			n		П	ig	n	as	55	uľ	al	IC	е					
		Here,	it is a	bout	the I	Highe	est le	vel	of as	ssura	nce							-										
		The d	lirectio	n Fe	dera	ted I	Missi	on N	letw	orki	ng is	hea	ding															





Attribute Based Access Controls

First: What does one need from IT?

- 1. Ability to rely on your (partners) information
- 2. If necessary, ability to keep your (partners) information secret

For sustaining trust

3. Followed by procedures for accountability and auditability

Then, you can have trusted connections with partners





Attribute Based Access Control

IS ABOUT GRANTING ACCESS TO INFORMATION BASED ON

- Attributes on people (screening, role, partner, etc)
- Attributes on information (sensitivity, subject, contracts, etc)
 THIS IS DATA CLASSIFICATION

Usefull attributes are derived from applicable policies like

- Export Controls
- Privacy
- Sensitivity
 - 1. from Intellectual Property (IP)
 - 2. from military or state secrets
- Archiving


Additional policies? Think about:

- Financial laws
- Medical laws
- Laws about intelligence
- Laws about Law Enforcing





Built in LibreOffice







Built in LibreOffice

- 1. Hardening data and the corresponding labels with SHA256
- 2. Data labels on document level for
 - a. Intellectual Property
 - b. Export Controls
- 3. Data labels for
 - a. Privacy
 - b. (Military) Sensitivity
 - c. Archiving
- 4. Data labels on paragraph level

Documented by

- Olivier Hatlot
- Cor Nouws

Technical details: Presentation Per Paragraph signatures by Ashod Nakashian

Format (military) sensitivity: [Policy Authority], [Sensitivity Level], [Duration], [Special Markings], start of paragraph....





Built in LibreOffice

Additional Implemented

- PDF Addvanced Digital Signature (PAdES) standard
- XML Advanced Digital Signature (XAdES) standard
- Signing of existing PDF





Summary

Electronic collaboration is emerging Network seperation is not scalable nor granular Attribute Based Access Controls are

For that one need the attributes

- Connected to the data
- Connected to the user
- Can also be connected to devices

For that one need policies

- To be edited by the business
- To be enforced

Attributes on data are implemented in LibreOffice

- Adaptable by "classification source file"





Questions

